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REVIEW

BAS VAN DER Facts About
VOSSEN Global Justice
Review of: Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail:
The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown
Business Publishing, 2012).
•
Why Nations Fail is an important book. It presents a powerful statement of a
plausible approach to understanding global development and poverty. And it
does so in a very clear and engaging way. This book deserves to be read widely.
Why Nations Fail is especially important for those interested in ethical issues of
development, poverty, and global justice. The book convincingly identifies certain
key causes of prosperity, inequality, and poverty. Acemoglu and Robinson point
us in the direction of the kinds of institutions that are necessary, and perhaps
sufficient, for lifting billions around the world out of their current conditions
of poverty and into conditions of lasting prosperity. No philosopher or political
theorist working on global justice can afford to ignore this book.
Overview
Most of the book is developed to illlustrate and defend a relatively simple thesis.
The main reasons why some countries are rich while others are poor are not their
geography, disease-burden, culture, or knowledge of economics. Instead, rich
countries are rich because they developed good institutions, and poor countries
are poor because they developed bad institutions.
Why Nations Fail thus contributes to the case for the so-called institutionalist
approach to development. Acemoglu and Robinson are prominent exponents of
this approach together with other noted economists like Douglas North, David
Landes, Dani Rodrik, and others.
The book also stresses an important refinement to that approach. Why
Nations Fail shows that development is due not merely to getting the economic
institutions right – something generally recognized by economists, if not always by
philosophers (more on that below) – but also requires good political institutions
– something generally recognized by philosophers, if not always by economists.
To distinguish good institutions from bad ones, Acemoglu and Robinson
introduce the terms inclusive and extractive institutions, respectively. The main
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difference has to do with whom these institutions empower, and can therefore
be expected to benefit. Inclusive institutions empower people across society, and
thus tend to benefit all. Extractive institutions empower only some, and thus tend
to benefit only small groups of people.
On the political side, inclusive institutions require a state that strikes a tricky
balance between a reasonable level of centralized power and pluralism. By
pluralism Acemoglu and Robinson mean the representation of many different
groups and interests in society, through free and competitive elections, governed
by the rule of law.
Inclusive political institutions uniquely avoid two kinds of destructive
outcomes that are at opposite extremes of a spectrum of political violence. On the
one extreme, there is anarchy and civil war. These are the result of insufficient
political centralization. On the other extreme, there is tyranny, oppression, and
rent-seeking. These are the result of too much concentration of power into the
hands of some. Societies that find themselves too close to either extreme contain
extractive political institutions.
On the economic side, inclusive institutions secure people’s rights to private
property, including private property rights over productive resources, and allow
these to be held broadly across society. These allow societies to experience the
kinds of specialization, exchange, investment, and innovation that increase
productivity. Acemoglu and Robinson write:
Inclusive [economic] institutions […] are those that allow and
encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic
activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable
individuals to make the choices they wish. To be inclusive, economic
institutions must feature secure private property, an unbiased system
of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing
field in which people can exchange and contract; it must also permit
the entry of new businesses and allow people to choose their careers
[…]. (pp. 74-5)
Extractive economic institutions, by contrast, are those that limit or altogether
prevent the ability of people across society to individually own private and
productive property, engage in commercial and profit-seeking activities, and
enjoy the fruits of their investments and innovations. Such institutions stifle
productivity.
A key theme of Why Nations Fail is the relation between political and economic
institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are the basic engines of growth and
prosperity. But such institutions do not operate in a vacuum. They need backing
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up by broadly dispersed political rights. Only when coupled with inclusive political
institutions can growth be sustained.
Once extractive political institutions are in place, extractive economic
institutions soon follow. When those in power no longer face pressures to
maintain an economic system in which all can participate and profit from their
own productive activities, they tend to reform the system to bolster and protect
their private gains. The effects, Acemoglu and Robinson summarize, are ugly:
Nations fail today because their extractive economic institutions do not
create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and innovate.
Extractive political institutions support these economic institutions
by cementing the power of those who benefit from the extraction…
In many cases, as […] in Argentina, Colombia, and Egypt, this failure
takes the form of lack of sufficient economic activity, because the
politicians are just too happy to extract resources or quash any type
of independent economic activity that threatens themselves and the
economic elites. In some extreme cases, as in Zimbabwe and Sierra
Leone … extractive institutions pave the way for complete state
failure, destroying not only law and order but also even the most basic
economic incentives. The result is economic stagnation and – as the
recent history of Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe
illustrates – civil wars, mass displacements, famines, and epidemics,
making many of these countries poorer today than they were in the
1960s. (pp. 372-3)
It is important to stress here that Acemoglu and Robinson do not deny that
economic growth can occur under extractive institutions. Such ‘extractive
growth’ can happen either because of strong policies of state investment in highly
productive sectors of the economy (as in Caribbean slave-economies from the
sixteenth until the eighteenth century, or the Soviet Union until the 1970s), or
because pockets of inclusive economic institutions exist in a larger extractive
setting (as in South Korea in the 1960s and 70s).
But such growth never lasts. Extractive economies sooner or later stop growing,
or collapse altogether, due to a lack of innovation, state incompetence, conflict
and corruption, or the withering away of whatever small inclusive parts may have
existed. Only inclusive economic institutions, protected by inclusive political
institutions, can offer the kinds of sustained investment, innovation, flexibility,
and creative destruction that create a continued path of growth and prosperity.
The upshot is that Why Nations Fail presses on us some painful truths. For
example, it underlines just how difficult it is to achieve lasting development in
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poor countries. The path to inclusive institutions is extremely elusive, full of
pit-falls and path-dependencies. In this way, Why Nations Fail demonstrates
the extremely destructive effects of colonialism. Colonial rulers typically set up
extractive institutions to enrich themselves. But once in place, these institutions
became difficult to dislodge. Poor countries stay poor, then, even after the initial
oppressors have left. And so-called liberation movements all too often consist of
local extractive elites picking up where foreigners left off.
One lesson Acemoglu and Robinson draw from this is that a number of standard
proposals found in the literature on global justice, global ethics, and development
are unrealistic. For example, it is unrealistic to think that poverty can be fought
by redistribution or foreign aid alone. The logic of extraction implies that such
attempts will either be stymied by the same institutions that caused poverty in
the first place, or (worse) help line the pockets of those doing the extracting. (pp.
450-5)
Acemoglu and Robinson have little more hope for the recently more popular
solution of so-called authoritarian growth, in which strongly centralized states
aggressively pursue policies of rapid industrialization. For, as with extractive
growth in general, such policies sooner or later run out of steam unless they are
backed up by inclusive political and economic institutions. Indeed, they might
even recreate the conditions that caused poverty and oppression in the first place.
(pp. 437-46)
These conclusions will be controversial, of course. And there are reasons for
concern about some of the arguments Acemoglu and Robinson develop. For
example, the definitions of inclusive and extractive institutions used in Why
Nations Fail are rather vague, and perhaps too vague to usefully distinguish
between different (and more informative) versions of the institutionalist approach.
This may misleadingly suggest a greater coherence between the various cases
Acemoglu and Robinson discuss than actually exists.
Another reason has to do with what is no doubt the most ambitious claim in
Why Nations Fail. Acemoglu and Robinson argue not just that inclusive economic
and political institutions are necessary conditions for sustained development and
growth, but that they are sufficient. It is unclear whether such a strong thesis can
be maintained. Acemoglu and Robinson wish to exclude the factors of geography,
culture, and economic knowledge altogether from the account of development.
But is it not unfair to say they are harder on those rival theories than they are on
their own.
But none of this should distract us from the book’s main achievement and
lessons. And the main lesson is clear: no country has ever experienced sustained
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economic development without inclusive economic and political institutions.
Escaping poverty and creating prosperity requires the broad enjoyment of private
property, economic freedom, the rule of law, and a democratic state.
Relevance for Theories of Global Justice
It is hard to overstate the importance of these findings for theories of global ethics
and global justice. All such theories aim at the eradication of poverty across the
globe. And all such theories are (therefore) to some extent applied and practical in
their implications. Thinking about global justice thus cannot proceed in isolation
from the state of the art of empirical thinking about these issues. And the best
evidence, of which Why Nations Fail is a part, tells us that, whatever else we do,
we need inclusive political and economic institutions everywhere.
By and large political philosophers and theorists have accepted this with respect
to inclusive political institutions. Many defend a variety of (human) rights that
would call for and support such institutions. There are numerous sophisticated
justifications of rights to democracy, political participation, education, and social
inclusion.
But philosophers and theorists have been slow to accept that good economic
institutions are equally important. Without such institutions, development stands
no chance. So whatever else we do, our attempts to eradicate poverty must include
policies that enable and encourage continued economic growth and productivity
across the globe. This includes robust protections for private property rights,
entrepreneurship, economic liberty, and innovation and investment.
These insights have not been sufficiently recognized in the theoretical literature
on global justice. Perhaps the most prominent example are those ethical theories
that focus primarily on the personal duties that poverty imposes on us. Peter Singer,
no doubt the most famous philosopher to hold such a view, writes that people in
rich countries ought to give away large parts of their income to organizations such
as Oxfam. His argument (in rather simplified form) goes as follows:1
1. If we can rescue people from desperate conditions, without thereby
giving up something of moral significance, then we ought to do so.
2. Most people in rich countries can rescue the global poor from their
desperate conditions, without thereby giving up something of moral
significance, by giving away large parts of their income.
3. Therefore, most people in rich countries ought to give away large
parts of their income.
1	The locus classicus of this argument is Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy and Public
Affairs 1/1 (1972), 229-43. For a more recent statement, see Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save (New York:
Random House, 2010).
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Insofar as philosophers have criticized Singer’s argument, they have tended to
focus on premise (1) of his argument. But works like Why Nations Fail show us
that the more serious problem with this argument is premise (2).
Premise (2) is false not just because much of the money given to those who
live under extractive institutions will go to waste. This almost no one denies, but
it also does not really affect Singer’s argument. Even if we have to waste $90 in
order to get $10 in the hands of the global poor, giving away $100 is still worth
our while.
The real problem, instead, is that wasting money while not addressing the
sources of poverty can be truly disastrous. Suppose rich people in the West give
away most of their money. And suppose that, as the institutionalist theories
suggest, giving away our money does nothing to remove the sources of poverty.
What will be the result of such an approach? It will not be that poverty in the
world is alleviated. For most of the money has either evaporated or, worse, lined
the pockets of those in charge of the institutions that create poverty in the first
place. At this end, little change will (tragically) occur.
At the other end, however, we can expect real change. Singer’s solution will
likely mean that standards of living in the West dramatically decline. When we
give away the money we would otherwise have used for our expensive jewelry, we
do not just lose that jewelry. The jewelry stores lose business. And when stores
lose business, employees lose their jobs. Similarly, suppliers to jewelry stores lose
their business, and their employees will lose their jobs as well. And the people
providing the things on which all these people would normally spend their money,
will lose their business, income, and jobs as well.2
This is not a recipe for helping people escape poverty. It is a recipe for making
the entire world poor. In his original article ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’,
Singer seemed to realize this. He wrote: ‘From the moral point of view, the
prevention of the starvation of millions of people outside our society must be
considered at least as pressing as the upholding of property norms within our
society’.3 Why Nations Fail shows that this is irresponsible. We ought not to
mess around with the system of property where we are fortunate enough to find
2	I am, of course, speaking in grand generalizations. And there are important exceptions to the long list of philosophers
who ignore the empirical evidence on development and growth. For examples (of different outlooks and backgrounds),
see Leif Wenar, ‘What We Owe to Distant Others’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2/3 (2003), 283-304, Leif
Wenar, ‘Poverty is no Pond’, in Patricia Illingworth, Thomas Pogge, and Leif Wenar (eds.), Giving Well: The Ethics
of Philanthropy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 104-132, and many of Wenar’s other excellent articles; Dale
Jamieson, ‘Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World’, The Journal of Ethics
9/1-2 (2005), 151-70; David Schmidtz, Person, Polis, Planet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 145-64;
Mathias Risse, ‘What We Owe to the Global Poor’, The Journal of Ethics 9/1-2 (2005), 81-117; Matthias Risse, ‘How
Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33/4 (2005), 349-76.
3 Singer (1972), p. 237.
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it working reasonably well. The odds of creating and sustaining such systems are
very small indeed.
In his recent book The Life You Can Save, Singer takes a different approach.
Instead of advocating the abolition of Western property systems, he now says he
wants people to give only as much money as will not threaten to undo prosperity
altogether. But this has not stopped him from continuing to claim that people in
the West ought to give away large chunks of their income. Without offering any
evidence, Singer confidently asserts that following his prescriptions will not lead
to negative economic results.4 Let’s say the jury is out on that one.
The objection here can be put more precisely. Suppose we accept Singer’s
principle that we ought to rescue people when we can. Singer proposes that we try
to save as many people as we can right now. But if we do what Singer tells us to do,
we will lose the ability to rescue equally poor people in the future. The problem,
then, is that achieving optimal savings today is not the same as achieving optimal
savings over time. Whatever is attractive about Singer’s moral premise, however,
is not just attractive today. So if anything, we ought to try and achieve optimal
savings over time. The cost of following Singer’s recommendations is the failure
to do just this.
The lesson is that the sources of economic productivity (commerce, investment,
exchange, innovation, etc.) and the benefits of the prosperity they bring about
cannot be so easily separated as Singer and others suppose. To really help the global
poor we need to find a way to rescue the global poor from their dire circumstances
without thereby sacrificing the conditions of growth and prosperity that make
rescue possible in the first place. The depressing truth is that this highly limits
what we can do to help the poor. But the uplifting truth is that solving poverty in
one place need not involve undoing wealth in another. What really solves poverty
is for people to have access to inclusive institutions.5
4

5

 inger (2010), pp. 38-9. Indeed Singer asserts that giving away our money will lead to global growth because it will
S
end poverty around the world. I agree that ending global poverty will be a great benefit to both the poor (obviously)
and the West. But there is no reason to believe that following Singer’s prescriptions, when separated from institutional
changes, will get us there.
Let me emphasize three points. First, again, I am not denying that we have duties of aid or charity. I believe we do have
these. The problem is that following Singer’s prescriptions is no way to fulfill these duties. Second, in my view, the best
thing we can do to give the global poor access to inclusive institutions is just that: open the borders. Finally, the claims I
have (rather quickly) put forward in the text are not based on the claims of Why Nations Fail alone, impressive though
it is. For other works supporting these claims, see Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations:
Why Some are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York: Norton, 1998); Robert Hall and Chad Jones, ‘Why Do Some
Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 114/1 (1999),
83-116; Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, ‘Institutions Rule: The Primary of Institutions over
Geography and Integration in Economic Development’, Journal of Economic Growth 9/2 (2004), 131-65; William
Easterly and Ross Levine, ‘Tropics, germs, and crops: how endowments influence economic development’, Journal
of Monetary Economics 50/1 (2003), 3-39; William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to
Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Hernando De Soto,
The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books,
2003), among many others.
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Where to Go from Here?
The philosophical literature on global justice and ethics contains disturbingly
many theories that proceed in ways that are strangely disconnected from the
best empirical studies about poverty and prosperity. Sometimes the empirical
insights are simply set aside or even ignored. And even those who do engage with
them or focus on the role of institutions frequently fail to see the forest for the
trees. Hence, we read proposals for new global institutions (ignoring that the
quality of domestic institutions is at least as important), we see arguments for
extensive redistribution (ignoring that such policies will be counter-productive
if not accompanied by institutional changes in developing countries), and so on.
The most important lesson that Why Nations Fail (and other works like it)
contains for philosophers working on global justice is this: getting our economic
institutions right is just as important as getting our political institutions right.
And the evidence strongly indicates that this means endorsing market societies,
with strong property rights over private and productive resources and economic
freedom for all.
It is hard to say why these facts have been ignored or denied by philosophers
for so long. Perhaps the hostility toward inclusive economic institutions is that
they are seen as contestable parts of neoliberal, libertarian, or other free market
perspectives. But this is to miss the point. Among the most exemplary inclusive
countries are European welfare states like Denmark, Sweden, and Germany.
Strong property rights and robust economic freedom are compatible with a variety
of redistributive policies. Why Nations Fail is far from a libertarian manifesto.
And if even those countries are too much market-oriented for our taste, well, I
propose we get over it. There is simply too much at stake.6
Bas van der Vossen
University of North Carolina Greensboro
Department of Philosophy
email: b_vande2@uncg.edu

6

I would like to thank Julian Culp for his many insightful and constructive remarks.
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